

## **Property Damage Reports**

**MARINE  
HSE DEPARTMENT  
PROPERTY DAMAGE REPORT**

1. Crew: **140**  
2. Client: **Woodside Australia**  
3. Division: **Far East Marine**  
4. Type of Crew: **Multi-Streamer**  
5. Vessel Name: **Western Pride**  
6. Name of Reporter: **Russ Blohn**  
7. Date of Accident: **02/23/2000**  
8. Date of Report: **02/23/2000**  
9. Type of Report: **First Report**  
10. Name of Driver: **First,** Last

11. Time of Accident: **06:00pm**  
12. Sea Conditions: **4 : waves 2 - 4 ft.**  
(Beaufort Sea State)  
13. Weather Conditions: **3 : wind 7 - 10 knots**  
(Beaufort Wind Speed)  
14. Location Where Damage Occurred: **At Sea (in production)**  
15. Specific Location Where Damage Occurred:  
**Bass Straits, Australia**

16. Damage to: **Other**  
17. Specific Damage:  
**Port Barovane damaged when vessel lost power.**

18. Extent of Damage: **Repairable In Port**  
19. Source of Damage: **Collision With Underwater Obstruction**  
20. Estimated Value of Loss: **Over \$ 50000**  
21. Exact Value of Loss: **2 days production, approx. \$30,000 to vane**  
22. Owner of Damaged Property/Equipment: **Western Geophysical**  
23. Factual Description of Accident :

**At 17:00 the port vane was deployed to tension up the newly installed vane wire prior to attachment to streamer no. 6. By 18:00 approx. 850 meters of vane wire was deployed. Vessel speed was maintained at 3.0 knots throughout deployment. Water depth was 87 meters. The Pride was in the same work area prior to the just completed port call which should have been clear of fishing gear. I was on the reel deck checking the streamer depth of number 6 streamer just prior to the incident. When I returned to the winch deck I noted the vane winch wire had slowed. The Gunner, Jason Phillips, inquired why the vessel had slowed down. Looking over the stern I noticed there was very little or no propeller wash. Sr. Observer Rolly Jaberina arrived on the scene on this time and also notice the lack of stern wash. Checking the back deck monitor I noticed the vessel speed was now showing 1.0 knots. I proceeded to the bridge and asked the Mate Vincent Pinto if there was a problem. He informed me he was checking out a fire alarm which had sounded approx. 5 minutes earlier. I informed him we were only doing 1.0 knot and he immediately sped up, he has quoted a 5% increase in vessel pitch. He also said he did not touch the throttles prior to my arriving on the bridge. There were no indications there was a problem with the main engines or any other problem other than the fire alarm. The Chief Engineer was also on the bridge checking out the fire alarm when I arrived on the bridge. I returned to the winch deck and by this time it was obvious the vane wire was on the sea bed. About five minutes later the port vane disappeared from view. The chase boat "Smit Lloyd 28" was requested to proceed toward the tailbuoy and keep an eye out for the port barovane during his transit. The vane wire was retrieved slowly. At 18:45 the**

Smit Lloyd reported pieces of polystyrene on the surface. This was later identified as pieces of the barovane float which imploded from depth pressure. The wire rope fairing started showing damage from the sea bed approx. 200 meters from the vane termination. The vane was on board at 19:40. The vane float was crushed and the forward fins damaged. With no spare vane on board or a crane capable of handling these vanes streamer number six was retrieved. With the streamer aboard at 22:30 the vessel proceeded for Portland replace the damaged vane.

24. Recommendation for Prevention of Recurrences:

**The actual cause of this incident is still being investigated.**

25. Was post-accident drug testing conducted?: No

If yes, where was the drug test conducted? If no, why was the drug test not conducted?

Comments: N/A

26. Was post-accident alcohol testing conducted?: No

If yes, where was the drug test conducted? If no, why was the drug test not conducted?

Comments: N/A

## Risk Potential Matrix

The purpose of these matrices is to identify POTENTIALLY serious incidents so they can be investigated thoroughly.

IMPORTANT: When rating the incident, select the worst PROBABLE result, not the worst IMAGINABLE or worst case scenario.

Environmental: A1  
Property Damage: A3  
Injury: N/A  
Company Reputation: A1

To select the risk potential ratings for each category, press Enter and choose ONE entry from the list. For a description of each rating, click on the "Estimating Risk Severity and Level of Exposure" button to view the risk potential matrix. You MUST select a rating for each category. Select "Not Applicable" where necessary.

**Estimating Risk  
Severity and Level of  
Exposure**

## Distribution:

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Form No. 302-3007

Rev. 7/98

**MARINE  
HSE DEPARTMENT  
PROPERTY DAMAGE REPORT**

1. Crew: **140**  
2. Client **Woodside Australia**  
3. Division: **Far East Marine**  
4. Type of Crew: **Multi-Streamer**  
5. Vessel Name: **Western Pride**  
6. Name of Reporter: **Wayne Buffham**  
7. Date of Accident: **01/11/2000**  
8. Date of Report: **01/14/2000**  
9. Type of Report: **First Report**  
10. Name of Driver: **First, Last**

11. Time of Accident: **16:32**  
12. Sea Conditions: **5 : waves 4 - 8 ft.**  
(Beaufort Sea State)  
13. Weather Conditions: **5 : wind 17 - 21 knots**  
(Beaufort Wind Speed)  
14. Location Where Damage Occurred: **At Sea (in production)**  
15. Specific Location Where Damage Occurred:  
**At start of line W00INV1906R1, Investigator Survey, Bass Strait South-eastern Australia.**

16. Damage to: **Other**  
17. Specific Damage:  
**Lost optic lines in lead-in possibly unrepairable, 400 mtrs of vane wire lost at sea.**

18. Extent of Damage: **Other**  
19. Source of Damage: **Equipment Failure**  
20. Estimated Value of Loss: **Over \$ 50000**  
21. Exact Value of Loss: **In excess of 5 days production**  
22. Owner of Damaged Property/Equipment: **Western Geophysical**  
23. Factual Description of Accident :

**The port vane wire parted 400 mtrs up from the termination at the point where the wire runs through the fairlead. At the time of the incident the vessel was on a straight course with all equipment trailing directly behind. The vane remained under tow connected to the outer lead-in by the outer lead-in tow warp. Sea conditions at that time were marginal and it was decided to leave all port streamers in place and retrieve the stbd equipment first, this would spread the tow loads over three lead-in's via the cross tag lines and lessen the chances of the outer lead-in parting. Once all stbd equipment was retrieved the vessel was brought minimum trailing speed and the slow process of retrieving the port equipment commenced. Streamer four was recovered onboard and steamer five was 50% recovered when the yale grips that secure the tow warp to the outer lead-in parted. The vessel commenced an immediate stbd turn to avoid dragging remaining streamers past the drifting vane. The equipment adrift consisted of one barovane 46, 400 mtrs of vane wire, one techno float attached to a master link with 4 x 35 ton shackles and a 100 mtr length tuffnose cross tagline. By 11:49 on the 13th Jan 2000 the last tailbuoy was recovered onboard and the vessel was back at the vane location at 15:00 hrs. The CMV was deployed to recover the equipment, but the operation was cancelled due to the unsuitable sea conditions, the CMV was secure onboard at 16:10. The CMV was again launched the following day at 16:16, the equipment was recovered in two phases. First the techno float and the 100 mtr tuffnose lagline were disconnected from the vane and towed back to the vessel, then all loose lines apart from the**

400 mtr vane wire were removed from the vane. The vessel then manoeuvred along side the vane and it was retrieved onboard. The 400 mtr length of parted vane wire was cut and lost overboard ( see environmental report )  
The recovery was complete at 19:50 14th Jan 2000.

24. Recommendation for Prevention of Recurrences:

**Use larger diameter wire when working in areas prone to heavy sea conditions.**

25. Was post-accident drug testing conducted?: No

If yes, where was the drug test conducted? If no, why was the drug test not conducted?

Comments: N/A

26. Was post-accident alcohol testing conducted?: No

If yes, where was the drug test conducted? If no, why was the drug test not conducted?

Comments: N/A

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Environmental: N/A

Property Damage: A4

Injury: A1

Company Reputation: N/A

To select the risk potential ratings for each category, press Enter and choose ONE entry from the list. For a description of each rating, click on the "Estimating Risk Severity and Level of Exposure" button to view the risk potential matrix. You MUST select a rating for each category. Select "Not Applicable" where necessary.

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